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Abstract
Mobile social networks and location-aware applications are becoming more and
more widespread in current wireless networks. Thanks to Wifi or Bluetooth-
enabled devices, everyday mobile users can enjoy new services. However, the
deployment of these mobile technologies leads to many concerns for privacy, es-
pecially location privacy. In wireless networks, external malicious parties can
monitor pseudonyms used for identification to learn mobile users’ location and
track their movements. A common technique for protecting location privacy con-
sists in changing pseudonyms in regions called mix zones. In this report, we
present a game-theoretic approach to evaluate the interaction and behaviors of
an attacker aiming to jeopardize mobile nodes’ location privacy and nodes willing
to thwart adversary’s spiteful plans. Assuming that such an attacker is armed
with local eavesdropping devices, he must deploy them in an efficient way to track
as many nodes as possible. On the other hand, mobile users have to define where
are the best places to locate their mix zones. In order to evaluate their potential
benefit, mobile nodes need to know the mixing effectiveness of possible mix zone
locations. We propose a simplified metric based on the mobility profiles to deter-
mine the location privacy achieved with mix zones. We also build a payoff model
to deal with costs, as well as benefits, led by this extended hide-and-seek game.
By means of analytical and numerical results, we show the existence of Nash
equilibria for all values of players’ costs and mobility parameters. We prove that
the adversary’s best behavior evolves regarding the benefit he gets from traffic
sniffing and the cost led by deployment of eavesdropping stations. On the other
hand, we show that, when the mobility profile is homogeneous, the mobile nodes’
best response is independent of the adversary’s deployment of sniffing stations.
Furthermore, the nodes’ best response is only dependent on the number of mix
zones they deploy, not on their particular locations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last three decades, the number of cell phones, laptops and other elec-
tronic mobile devices has tremendously increased. In the last few years, these
mobile devices have started to be equipped, besides cellular interfaces (GSM),
with peer-to-peer communication technologies, such as WiFi or Bluetooth. They
enable new services and applications such as context-aware applications. For
example, in France, INRIA, in collaboration with JCDecaux (second largest out-
door advertising corporation in the world), is currently developing a service that
will allow a person passing in front of a movie advertising board to download
the trailer on his mobile phone via Bluetooth or Infrared. In front of a car bill-
board, he will receive the address of the closest car dealer by SMS. These services
would require user’s prior consent and registration of personal information (age,
leisure, ...) on his phone [23]. Another benefit provided by these new communi-
cation technologies is the possibility given to friends to automatically detect and
exchange information through mobile social networks [1, 2].
However, the deployment of these technologies leads to serious privacy issues.
As Buttya´n and Hubaux show with RFID tags [6], without privacy protecting
measures, our wireless world “could easily degenerate into the one described by
Orwell in his book 1984”. Nowadays, it is easy for an ordinary person to mon-
itor all Bluetooth-enabled devices and process gathered information using an
automated system [11]. In order to prevent these new threats on privacy, an
information report written by two French senators reaffirms the right to privacy
as a fundamental right of our democratic countries. They warn us of the dan-
ger led by new technologies (Bluetooth, RFID tags, geolocation, ...), the surge
of social networks and their consequences on privacy. They make fifteen recom-
mandations in order to better protect the right to privacy in our new information
age [10]. Daniel Solove also asserts that it is imperative to have a theory about
what privacy is and why it is valuable [32]. This suggests that it is also ex-
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tremely imperative to develop novel technical mechanisms in order to protect
this privacy. In this project, we concentrate on privacy-preserving mechanisms
in wireless networks.
In mobile wireless networks, a malicious third party can monitor pseudonyms
used for identification to learn mobile nodes’ locations. Mobile nodes (e.g. pedes-
trian or vehicular) can be tracked by monitoring their MAC (Medium Access
Control) addresses (link layer identifiers), IP addresses (network layer identifiers)
or even wireless fingerprints (physical layer identifiers). An adversary aiming
to track mobile devices is also able to eavesdrop the public keys (application
layer identifiers) that have been either preloaded into mobile devices or directly
generated by mobile nodes. An external party can compromise the location pri-
vacy, defined in [21] as the ability to prevent other parties from learning one’s
movement.
One common technique for improving the location privacy consists in using
multiple pseudonyms [3] and coordinate their changes in regions called mix zones
[4]. Other popular techniques developed to prevent nodes’ tracking will be de-
tailed in chapter 2.
In contrast with previous works that assume the presence of a global passive
adversary (GPA) being able to eavesdrop all communications, we study location
privacy amidst local eavesdroppers. We keep the assumption of a passive adver-
sary (the adversary cannot inject messages into a target’s neighborhood) and
thus call the malicious external party a local passive adversary (LPA). We think
that global coverage assumption is too simplistic for several reasons. First, no
network has a complete coverage, even a phone network. Second, cost might be
too expensive for an adversary to build and maintain a global eavesdropping net-
work. Third, computational complexity is as well too high to sort and process all
the received signals. Finally, the adversary gets more flexibility and can change
the place of stations dynamically.
The first main contribution lies in the use of a game-theoretic approach to
model the interaction between mobile nodes’ and adversary’s strategies. As we
made the LPA assumption, the attacker has a limited number of eavesdrop-
ping stations and, thus, must optimize their placement to efficiently track mobile
nodes. Moreover, these devices are not free and incur a non-negligible cost. On
the other hand, we assume that mobile nodes use active (or silent) mix zones to
protect their location privacy. We define an active mix zone as a precise place
where mobile devices deliberately shut their transmitters down. As mobile nodes
must both change pseudonyms and stop transmitting during the time they are
within the mix zones, mix zones are costly for mobile nodes. Trade-off between
benefits and costs, as well as interaction and conflicting goals between mobile
nodes’ and attacker’s strategies led us to tackle this problem using game theory.
Second, we develop a simplified flow-based measure of the mix zone’s effec-
3tiveness. This measurement, in terms of the location privacy it provides, depends
on the adversary’s ability to correlate nodes that enter and leave the mix zone.
Previous works on mix zones’ effectiveness was either event-based [3] or flow-based
[14]. We propose to base our analysis on entering and exiting traffic intensities,
and on the variances of nodes’ sojourn time. It keeps the interesting feature of
flow-based model, which is to be able to compute mixing effectiveness prior to
mix zones’ deployment, and remains simple and intuitive.
The remainder of this Master thesis is structured as follows. In next chap-
ter, we will briefly discuss current privacy-preserving mechanisms and metrics
measuring the level of location privacy. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the system
model. We also explain, in chapter 3, how we derive the simplified flow-based
effectiveness measure. In chapter 4, we derive and clarify both the nodes’ and
adversary’s payoff functions. Chapter 5 provides the analytical and simulated
results. Finally, in chapter 6 we conclude and present the remaining challenges.

Chapter 2
Related work
In order to achieve location privacy, mobile nodes can first merely add noise to
their location [18], or report their location as a region instead of a point [33].
Unfortunately, these techniques are insufficient to protect location privacy since
peer-to-peer wireless communications between nodes unveil their locations.
Freudiger et al. develop a new paradigm based on ring signatures [13]. Ring
signatures schemes are simplified group signatures, which are themselves a “gen-
eralization” of the credential/membership authentification schemes. Group sig-
natures [8] represent a signature scheme that allow a group member to sign on
behalf of a group without revealing the identity of the signer. They have the
following three properties. First, only members of the group can sign messages.
Second, the receiver can verify that it is a valid group signature, but cannot
discover which group member made it. Third, in case of dispute later on, the
signature can be ”opened” to reveal the identity of the signer. Unlike group sig-
natures, ring signatures [27] need no group managers, no setup procedures, no
revocation procedures, and no coordination. The members of a ring can thus
change over time without central coordination. Ring signatures are finally useful
when the members do not want to cooperate, contrarily to group signatures that
require cooperation of members. For both ring and group signatures, the size of
the group respectively the ring determines the privacy of its members.
Besides cryptographic constructions, mobile nodes can also protect their loca-
tion privacy using spatial/temporal mixing. To efficiently mix their trajectories,
nodes must first change their pseudonyms over time. But this is not sufficient. In-
deed, only changing pseudonyms does not help since most of time mobile nodes
have different speeds and trajectories and, thus, attacker can jeopardize their
location privacy using spatial and temporal correlation.
In order to make correlation harder, Huang et al. propose to stop transmitting
for a variable length silent period during which at least two nodes close together
5
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are changing their pseudonyms [20]. This leads us to mix zone’s concept [4]. Mix
zones are pre-determined regions within which mobile nodes are forced to change
their pseudonyms. However, important drawback of mix zones is that they are
inefficient when nodes’ density is low and can be costly in terms of pseudonym
management.
Another method enhancing location privacy is Swing & Swap [24], which is
user-centric. Swing enables nodes to loosely synchronize updates when changing
their velocity. Swap, an extension of Swing, provides even more location privacy.
It assumes cooperation of nodes that enables exchange of their identifiers.
We need to define appropriate metrics in order to measure the level of location
privacy in mix zones, i.e. mix zones’ efficiency. In [26], Pfitzmann and Ko¨hntopp
define anonymity as state of being not identifiable within a set of subject, the
anonymity set. In mobile networks, the anonymity set is typically the set of nodes
within the mix zone.
Serjantov and Danezis [29] point out some issues associated with the anonymity
set and proposes an information-theoretic metric based on entropy and anonymity
probability distribution. Using mix-based anonymity systems [7] in which all net-
work communication is observable by the attacker, they discuss the vulnerability
of anonymity set metric against an attacker’s additional knowledge (the proba-
bilities of A communicating with B and C for instance). In mobile networks, the
distribution of nodes entering and leaving the mix zone may well represent the
metric developed by Serjantov and Danezis.
Freudiger et al. propose a novel metric based on nodes’ mobility profiles [14].
They compute the mixing effectiveness prior to operations of mobile network
using an information-theoretic distance measure: the Jensen-Shannon divergence.
They provide a lower and an upperbound on the probability of error made by an
adversary aiming to track mobile nodes. These bounds on probability of error
take into account the relative flow intensities and the sojourn time distributions,
modeled as Normal distributions, within the mix zones.
Finally, Shokri et al. present in [31] formal representations of four among the
most relevant categories of location privacy metrics. They analyse these metrics
based on a set of criteria such as probability of error, tracking error and actual
trace. In addition, they propose a distortion-based metric for measuring location
privacy. In this metric, they estimate how distorted is the reconstructed actual
trace of each user at any time epoch. The location privacy of a mobile nodes
is then directly proportional to the distortion level in reconstructing his actual
trace.
Even though nodes transmitting and receiving data over a mobile wireless
network are vulnerable to location tracking and other privacy-leaking attacks,
they also get important advantages such as location-based applications, which
use node’s current location to provide services (e.g., restaurant or gas station
7close to nodes, road traffic information). The data quality providing by location-
aware services depends mainly on the accuracy of location information. Mix
zones, Swing & Swap and all other techniques based on silent period need to
stop transmitting during a variable length of time. This leads to a decrease in
quality of location-based services, which is a non-negligible cost for nodes. In
[19], Hoh and Gruteser propose a QoS metric based on mean location error for
a set of N different users’ paths of length K. In order to enhance QoS while
still protecting location privacy, [22] develops a protocol called silent cascade.
This model achieves anonymity without violating QoS by trading off the length
of mix-network for anonymity.

Chapter 3
Preliminaries
3.1 System model
We consider a part of a road network composed of N mobile nodes equipped
with peer-to-peer communication technologies, such as WiFi or Bluetooth. We
model this road network as a 2-by-2 grid, representing four roads crossing at four
intersections. This simplified model does not encompass the whole complexity
of a real geographical space but can be viewed as a small part of a greater map.
Indeed, by assembling many 2-by-2 grids, we could almost reach typical road
networks, such as Manhattan’s one. Moreover, we must have a simple model in
order to keep level of complexity acceptable.
The adversary installs eavesdropping stations at crossroads. Therefore, in
our model, he has at most four different places where he can sniff the network,
which matches with our local adversary assumption. Even though the attacker
places four sniffing stations, he still does not have a complete coverage since the
adversary is not able to eavesdrop the communications of nodes outside the range
of his radio receivers.
On the other hand, mobile nodes assign the responsibility to establish secu-
rity and privacy in the network to a trusted central authority (e.g., in vehicular
networks, the vehicle registration authority). This authority deploys a limited
number of active mix zones at crossroads. In order to mix their trajectories, mo-
bile nodes stop transmitting during the time they spend within mix zones (what
we call active in contrast with passive mix zone that we define as the region where
the adversary has no coverage). We assume that mix zones are a bit smaller than
adversary’s coverage radius. Each mix zone i is traversed by incoming roads
rj ∈ Ri ⊆ R. Previous work on mix zones’ effectiveness was either event-based
[3] or flow-based [14]. We propose to base our analysis on entering and exiting
traffic intensities, as well as variances of mobile nodes’ sojourn time. As we ex-
9
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Figure 3.1: System model. 2-by-2 grid that represents 4 roads crossing at 4 points
of junction. Intersections are numbered from 1 to 4, from top left to bottom right.
plain in section 3.2, this is a simplified version of flow-based model derived in
[14]. It keeps the interesting feature of flow-based model, which is to be able to
compute mixing effectiveness prior to mix zones’ deployment.
Figure 3.1 shows our system model, with traffic intensity expressed as λi. We
assume that intensities entering and exiting the intersections at a precise point
are equal. Note that λ2 is equal to λ8 since nodes exiting intersection 1 are going
directly to intersection 3. In the same way, λ1 = λ7, λ6 = λ12 and λ9 = λ15. The
traffic intensities are formally defined in a square matrix F :
F =

λ0 λ1 λ2 λ3
λ4 λ5 λ6 λ7
λ8 λ9 λ10 λ11
λ12 λ13 λ14 λ15

where the lines represent the four road intersections C = {C1, C2, C3, C4} and the
columns the point of entrance of nodes in the intersection. First column means
that nodes come from the North, second one from the East, third one from the
South and fourth from the West. Moreover, we define a vector ~µ which represents
the expected time the nodes spend within each intersection (sojourn time) that
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Figure 3.2: Example with 2 mix zones and 2 eavesdropping stations:
~m = [1 0 0 1]T , ~a = [0 0 1 1]T .
will be useful to compute the cost due to disconnected time:
~µ =

µ1
µ2
µ3
µ4

Finally, a matrix V of sojourn time variances represents variances of delays for
each possible entries at each intersection:
V =

σ20 σ
2
1 σ
2
2 σ
2
3
σ24 σ
2
5 σ
2
6 σ
2
7
σ28 σ
2
9 σ
2
10 σ
2
11
σ212 σ
2
13 σ
2
14 σ
2
15

Based on the intensity matrix F, and variances matrix V (mobility profile), we
would like to compute the effectiveness provided by placing a mix zone for each
intersection. In this way, we will be able to compute the best placement of mix
zones for the nodes, i.e., get the best strategy. Vector ~m represents the presence
(entry equal to 1) or absence (entry equal to 0) of a mix zone. The adversary
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will be as well able to optimize the placement of his sniffing stations given the
mobility profile of nodes. His strategic vector is ~a, with entries equalling 1 if he
places an eavesdropping station at the intersection and 0 otherwise. Figure 3.2
is an example of possible nodes’ and adversary’s behavior.
We link effectiveness of mix zones directly to the uncertainty it leads to for the
adversary trying to track nodes. Based on work done in [14], we derived a metric
that takes into account the flows’ delay, the relative and absolute intensities of
flows. In next subsection, we formally derive this value and explain how we are
getting it.
3.2 Mix zones effectiveness
We base the derivation of the effectiveness measure essentially on the work done
in [14] and the conclusions they reached. In this paper, they take four mobility
factors into account in order to capture the whole uncertainty, described as a
probability of error, provided by a mix zone. These four factors come from two
different features of flows: their intensities and their sojourn time distribution.
The first factor used to compute the probability of error is given by the relative
intensities of flows, what is called the a priori probability. The second one in-
volved at the end of the computation of this probability of error is given by the
absolute intensities of flows. The last two factors are included in the sojourn time
distributions. They are the mean and variance of sojourn times. These are used
to model the sojourn times of different flows, that are distributed according to
Normal distributions.
Although the difference of sojourn time means between two different flows
is helpful to distinguish between the two distributions, we decide here, in order
to keep a succinct effectiveness measure, to take only the intensities and the
sojourn time variances into account. Indeed, as nodes entering the mix zone via
different roads have independent random rates of arrival, the difference δ between
an arrival from one road and another is completely random. Hence, even with
a large difference between two expected sojourn times ∆, nodes might still be
very difficult to distinguish at the exit if their difference of arrival times δ is
approximately equal to ∆. As arrival rates are independent, the probability to
have δ ≈ ∆ should not be smaller than δ ≈ 0 if ∆ is not too big. Therefore,
we assume that, among all entering nodes and not only two specific arrivals, the
intensities and the sojourn time variances encompass all the main information
needed to evaluate global uncertainty provided by a mix zone.
First, we focus on the relative intensities of flows and compute the entropy led
by the probabilities of incoming flows. Entropy plays a central role in information
theory as a measure of information, choice and uncertainty [30]. It has been
proposed as a metric for anonymity in [29]. Let us assume that n entering roads
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Figure 3.3: Model with n = 3 entering roads leaving at the same exit.
are converging to one exiting road (Figure 3.3). We get the highest possible value
of entropy whether all incoming road flows have the same probability, thus equal
to 1/n. The more different the probabilites are, the less is the uncertainty for
the attacker, and so the smaller the entropy. This value contains uncertainty (or
certainty) led by the relative intensity of flows.
Second, we need to take the absolute intensities of flows into account. The
uncertainty increases when the number of entering nodes is bigger, i.e. when the
sum of intensities of entering roads is higher. This is quite intuitive since the
more nodes there are within the crossroads, the more dense is the output and
thus the more difficult is the monitoring process for the adversary. This value
includes the uncertainty (or certainty) led by the absolute intensity of flows.
Finally, the adversary is using as well the information about sojourn times
(delays) of the different entering flows. We assume that delays are distributed
as Gaussian distributions, with possibly different means and variances. What is
of first importance in delays distribution for our metric is the variance of each
sojourn time distribution. The greater are the variances, the harder it is for
the adversary to match entering with leaving nodes. This value takes thus into
account the uncertainty (or certainty) led by the sojourn time distributions.
Note that we assume for simplicity, as in [14] that the sojourn time distribu-
tion is independent of the flows’ intensity. The model can be extended to capture
the dependency between mobile nodes’ arrivals, intensities, and their effect on
the sojourn time distributions [16].
We are now able to express this effectiveness measure formally. Let us call it
Etot. Then, assuming we have n entering road segments r1, ..., rn, total uncer-
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tainty is equal to the multiplication of all these three mixing factors:
Etot = H(~p)σ¯2
n∑
i=1
λi [bits · nodes] (3.1)
where pi’s are the relative intensity probabilities:
pi =
λi∑n
j=1 λj
, (3.2)
the entropy [9] is:
H(~p) = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi (3.3)
and the average variance is:
σ¯2 =
n∑
i=1
piσ
2
i (3.4)
In order to test this new metric, we plot three different graphs providing the
uncertainty with respect to two of the three factors. Note here that we use n = 2
entering flows. Figure 3.4 shows how our uncertainty measure is influenced by
the sum of intensities λ1 + λ2 and by the ratio λ2/λ1 of flows’ intensities, with
fixed average variance equal to σ¯2 = 0.6. Figure 3.5 displays the values of our
uncertainty measure for different average variances σ¯2 and different ratios λ2/λ1,
with fixed absolute intensities λ1 + λ2 = 1. Figure 3.6 shows how the measure
varies with absolute values of intensities λ1 + λ2 and the average variance σ¯2,
with a fixed ratio λ2/λ1 = 1. First, we observe that if either λ1 + λ2 or σ¯2
increases, then Etot increases as well, showing that if intensity of nodes entering
and exiting the mix zone is higher it becomes much more difficult to track every
nodes accurately. It also shows that if variances of sojourn time distributions in-
crease, then uncertainty raises proportionaly since delay probability distribution
function is less narrow and thus exit time distributed over a wider range with
higher probability. In addition, we observe in figures 3.4 and 3.5 that if λ2/λ1
increases and absolute intensities and delay variances remain constant, uncer-
tainty decreases. The intuition is that as the ratio between two flows’ intensities
increases, the flow with higher intensity dominates the exit of the considered mix
zone and becomes easier to track. The uncertainty, and thus the mixing effec-
tiveness, is maximal when both flows have the same intensity (λ2/λ1 = 1) and
have the highest possible intensities and sojourn time variances.
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Figure 3.4: Uncertainty measure Etot [bits · nodes] led by two entering roads r1
and r2 with fixed average variance σ¯2 = 0.6s, λ2/λ1 ∈ [1, 10], and λ1 +λ2 ∈ [0, 3].
As λ1 + λ2 increases, nodes’ density within the mix zone increases as well and it
becomes more difficult to correlate exiting events to entering ones. The increase
in Etot is slower if ratio λ2/λ1 is bigger.
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Figure 3.5: Uncertainty measure Etot [bits · nodes] with fixed sum of absolute
intensities λ1 + λ2 = 1, σ¯2 ∈ [0, 2], and λ2/λ1 ∈ [1, 10]. As average variance σ¯2
raises, uncertainty on time of exit increases and thus correlation becomes harder.
The increase in Etot is slower if ratio λ2/λ1 is bigger.
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Figure 3.6: Uncertainty measure Etot [bits· nodes] with fixed ratio λ2/λ1 = 1,
σ¯2 ∈ [0, 2], and λ1 + λ2 ∈ [0, 3]. As σ¯2 and λ1 + λ2 increase, uncertainty increase
proportionally to both parameters.
Chapter 4
Game model
4.1 Game-theoretic background
In this chapter, we define and explain a game that models the conflict between
mobile nodes willing to protect their location privacy and the adversary trying
to jeopardize it.
Game theory allows for modeling such conflicting situations and for predict-
ing the behavior of participants. Roger B. Myerson defines it as the “study
of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational
decision-makers” [25]. In our analysis, as in all game-theoretic models, we assume
that participants are rational, which means that they make decisions consistently
in pursuit of their own payoff’s maximization. Finally, it should be remembered
here that game theory is the logical fulfillment of decision theory and has been
first used in economics and political science to model human behaviors.
We first define a game G as a triplet (P, S, U), where P is the set of players,
S is the set of strategies and U is the set of payoff functions:
• Players: There are two of them. The first one is represented by the aggre-
gation of mobile nodes, that are cooperating together in order to achieve
location privacy. Freudiger et al. have already studied protection of location
privacy, but in a user-centric manner assuming non-cooperative behavior of
the mobile nodes [12]. We call this first player n. The second player is the
adversary or attacker, called a, whose aim is to track mobile nodes. Hence,
the set of players is P = {n, a} where n is itself the set of all mobile nodes
within the network.
• Strategies: Each player has 16 possible strategies. Mobile nodes use active
mix zones and must decide whether to make them run or not, for each
crossroads. The strategies sxn ∈ Sn are represented by vector ~m, of length
17
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4 (number of intersections in the network) with mi = {0 (no mix zone), 1
(mix zone)}. As we have two alternatives, “place” a mix zone (mi = 1)
or not (mi = 0), at each crossroads, we get 24 = 16 strategies, from zero
(s1n) to four mix zones (s
16
n ). On the other hand, the adversary deploys
eavesdropping stations at crossroads to efficiently track the nodes. His
strategies sxa ∈ Sa are represented by vector ~a, of length 4 as well, with
ai = {0 (no sniffing station), 1 (sniffing station)}. The attacker also has
the choice to place an eavesdropping station (ai = 1) or not (ai = 0) at
each crossroads. He then also has 24 = 16 different strategies, from zero
(s1a) to four sniffing stations (s
16
a ). The set of strategies in the game is thus
S = {~m,~a} .
• Payoff Functions: Generally speaking, payoff is expressed as benefit minus
cost. Mobile nodes’ payoff function is thus define as un = bn − cn and
ua = ba − ca. In next section, we will explain in more details our benefits
and costs, for both players.
Before concentrating on the payoffs, let us introduce game-theoretic concepts,
such as best response and Nash equilibrium, and define the type of game we are
dealing with.
We assume a complete information game, which means that each player’s pay-
off function is common knowledge among all the players [17]. We then assume
that the adversary is aware of mobile nodes’ mobility profile, i.e., that he knows
the traffic intensities and the sojourn time distributions for all entries of cross-
roads. In addition, our game is a non-cooperative one. Although mobile nodes
are cooperating together to form a coalition and thus one unique player (just like
Luxembourg, Switzerland and Austria are cooperating to protect bank secrecy
against EU complaints), they are not cooperating with the adversary since nodes
get no incentive to it. Their main goal is to thwart attacker’s tracking and thus
cooperation with the adversary is irrelevant here. Finally, we approach this model
with a simultaneous (or static) game, i.e. the players simultaneously choose ac-
tions and then receive payoffs that depend on the combination of actions just
chosen.
Let us now introduce the concept of best response. We can write bri(sj), the
best response of player i to the opponent’s strategy sj .
Definition 4.1. The best response function of player i to the profile of strategies
sj is a function br : sj → si that maximizes player i’s payoff given other player’s
strategies sj. We can express it formally as:
bri(sj) = arg max
si∈Si
ui(si, sj) (4.1)
4.2. BENEFITS 19
If two strategies are mutual best responses to each other, then no player has
the motivation to deviate from the given strategy profile. This leads us to the
concept of Nash Equilibrium.
Definition 4.2. A strategy profile s∗ constitutes a Nash equilibrium if , for each
player i,
ui(s∗i , s
∗
j ) ≥ ui(si, s∗j ), ∀si ∈ Si (4.2)
where s∗i and s
∗
j are the Nash equilibrium strategies of player i and j, respectively.
In a Nash equilibrium, none of the players can unilaterally change his strategy
to increase his payoff.
4.2 Benefits
4.2.1 Mobile nodes
Nodes obtain benefit only at the intersections where they place a mix zone. Then,
either the adversary places a sniffing station at the same crossroads, or he does
not, and benefit will depend on the attacker’s strategy as well.
If there are both a sniffing station and a mix zone at intersection i, then each
node going through this point of junction yields a benefit of
∑
j:rj∈Ri
Ej
4 where
Ej is the uncertainty for the adversary at exit road rj . We assume that nodes
are entering through road rk, leaving through road rj , following an homogeneous
Poisson process. The rate of arrival is λk, and of departure λj . From stochastic
processes theory, we know that the expectation of a Poisson process N(t) of
intensity λ is
E [Nj(T )] = λjT. (4.3)
Hence, for all j : rj ∈ Ri, we need to multiply our sum by λjttot where ttot is the
total time during which the nodes are moving in the network. The benefit for
nodes with presence of both a mix zone and a sniffing station at an intersection
is: ∑
roads j∈i
Ej
4
(4.4)
Regarding the case when there is a mix zone and no sniffing station at the
intersection i, we assume that the mixing power of the mix zone is maximum.
Therefore, we use an upperbound on Ej that we call Eimax and we get a benefit
equal to ∑
roads j∈i
λjTE
i
max
4
(4.5)
We can now express the nodes’ benefit.
bn =
4∑
i=1
mi
ai 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjTEj
4
+ (1− ai)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjTE
i
max
4
 (4.6)
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4.2.2 Adversary
The adversary will get a benefit only at the crossroads where he is sniffing the
network. As for the nodes, the adversary’s benefit also depends on the nodes’
strategy. The payoff will be higher whether there is no mix zone bothering at-
tacker’s tracking.
In this case, the adversary will get the same benefit as the nodes when there
is a mix zone without any sniffing station. We consider the adversary being able
to sniff all the nodes going through the intersection i and thus getting a benefit
of Eimax per node. ∑
roads j∈i
λjTE
i
max
4
(4.7)
If the nodes’ strategy is to place a mix zone at the same intersection as the ad-
versary’s sniffing station, then his benefit will be proportional to
∑
j:rj∈Ri
Eimax−Ej
4 .
When the uncertainty led by the mix zone is maximal, the benefit is very small
or even zero and when the uncertainty tends to be small, the tracking benefit
will be much higher. Hence, total benefit for an adversary sniffing at crossroads
i with a mix zone’s presence is
∑
roads j∈i
λjT (Eimax − Ej)
4
(4.8)
Let us now express the adversary’s total benefit.
ba =
4∑
i=1
ai
mi 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjT (Eimax − Ej)
4
+ (1−mi)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjTE
i
max
4
 (4.9)
4.3 Costs
Let us discuss now the nodes’ and adversary’s costs. Placing a mix zone or an
eavesdropping station is not free, neither for the nodes nor for the attacker.
csilencen =
disconnected time
connected time
= f(F, ~µ, ~m, T ) (4.10)
4.3.1 Mobile nodes
The first cost of the nodes is related to the price of a pseudonym. As suggested in
[12], pseudonym change is costly because it requires contacting a central author-
ity, or self-generating a new pseudonym. Moreover, routing [28] becomes more
difficult and requires frequent updates of routing tables. The cost of changing
one pseudonyms is equal to γ. We then get a global cost of
cpseudon = γT (F ·~1)t ~m (4.11)
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The second cost is involved by the time when the nodes stop transmitting and
receiving data. It has for instance great impact on quality of service for location-
aware applications. We compute this cost as the ratio of disconnected time over
connected time. Total disconnected time is equal to ttot(F · ~1)T ~µm where vector
~µm is an aggregation of vectors ~µ and ~m:
~µm =

µ1 ·m1
µ2 ·m2
µ3 ·m3
µ4 ·m4

Total connected time is equal to total time minus total disconnected time. In
order to ease the analysis, we express total time ttot as four times the time spent
in the crossroads. We thus assume that nodes spend on average one quarter of
time within the crossroads and three quarters outside them. Factor 4 can be
replaced by another one if needed. Total cost is
csilencen =
ttot(F ·~1)T ~µm
ttot(F ·~1)T 4~µ− ttot(F ·~1)T ~µm
= ttot
(F ·~1)T ~µm
(F ·~1)T 4~µ− (F ·~1)T ~µm
(4.12)
Finally, global nodes’ cost is
cn = γttot(F ·~1)T ~m+ ttot (F ·
~1)T ~µm
(F ·~1)T 4~µ− (F ·~1)T ~µm
(4.13)
4.3.2 Adversary
Attacker’s cost is highly related to the cost of managing the sniffing stations’
operations, monitoring the network and processing eavesdropped signals. It is
thus proportional to the total time and the number of eavesdropping stations
deployed by the adversary, weighted by a constant factor β:
ca =
βT
∑
i ai
4
(4.14)
4.4 Payoffs
Mixing both previous subsections, we can now express the complete payoff for-
mulas:
un =
4∑
i=1
mi
ai 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjttotEj
4
+ (1− ai)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjttotE
i
max
4

− γttot(F ·~1)T ~m− ttot (F ·
~1)T ~µm
(F ·~1)T 4~µ− (F ·~1)T ~µm
(4.15)
22 CHAPTER 4. GAME MODEL
ua =
4∑
i=1
ai
mi 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjttot(Eimax − Ej)
4
+ (1−mi)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjttotE
i
max
4

− βttot
∑4
i=1 ai
4
(4.16)
We can already simplify both un and ua by ttot and then get payoff functions
independent of the total time of network operations/simulation:
un =
4∑
i=1
mi
ai 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjEj
4
+ (1− ai)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjE
i
max
4

− γ(F ·~1)T ~m− (F ·
~1)T ~µm
(F ·~1)T 4~µ− (F ·~1)T ~µm
(4.17)
ua =
4∑
i=1
ai
mi 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λj(Eimax − Ej)
4
+ (1−mi)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjE
i
max
4

− β
∑4
i=1 ai
4
(4.18)
It remains to express Ej and Eimax mathematically. From section 3.2, un-
certainty Ej is the multiplication of three factors: the absolute values of traffic
intensities λi’s, the entropy led by the relative difference between these traffic
intensities and the mean of traffic delays’ variances.
∀i ∈ C = {C1, C2, C3, C4} and ∀j such that rj ∈ Ri ⊆ R,
Ej = (λkj + λlj + λmj )H(αjλkj , αjλlj , αjλmj )σ¯
2
j (4.19)
with
kj = j + 1 (mod 4) + 4(i− 1)
lj = j + 2 (mod 4) + 4(i− 1)
mj = j + 3 (mod 4) + 4(i− 1)
αj =
1
λkj + λlj + λmj
and
σ¯2j = αj
(
λkjσ
2
kj
+ λljσ
2
lj
+ λmjσ
2
mj
)
Now, regarding the computation of Eimax, we would like to get an upperbound
on our uncertainty measure. We thus maximize all of the three different factors
we are taking into account.
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First, from theorem 2.3.1 of [15], entropy is upperbounded by logK where K is
the number of elements for our sample space, and equal to 3 in our case. Hence,
our maximal entropy is equal to log 3.
Second, we must use an upperbound on the absolute traffic intensities value. Let
us first define
λi,max = max
j:rj∈Ri
λj∀i (4.20)
Then, ∀i,
(λkj + λlj + λmj ) ≤ (λi,max + λi,max + λi,max) = 3λi,max (4.21)
We thus choose 3λi,max as upperbound. Finally, defining
σ2i,max = max
j:rj∈Ri
σ2j∀i (4.22)
we get
σ¯2j ≤ σ2i,max (4.23)
and the upperbound is σ2i,max∀i. Putting everything together, the overall upper-
bound on uncertainty is
Eimax = 3λi,maxσ
2
i,max log 3 (4.24)
Rewriting (4.17) and (4.18) and replacing Ej and Eimax by their actual values,
un =
4∑
i=1
mi
ai 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjEj
4
+ (1− ai)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjE
i
max
4

− γ(F ·~1)T ~m− (F ·
~1)T ~µm
(F ·~1)T 4~µ− (F ·~1)T ~µm
=
4∑
i=1
mi
[
ai
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λj
(
λkj + λlj + λmj
)
H
(
αjλkj , αjλlj , αjλmj
)
σ¯2j
4
+ (1− ai)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λj(3λi,maxσ2i,max log 3)
4
]
−γ(F ·~1)T ~m− (F ·
~1)T ~µm
(F ·~1)T 4~µ− (F ·~1)T ~µm
(4.25)
ua =
4∑
i=1
ai
mi 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λj(Eimax − Ej)
4
+ (1−mi)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjE
i
max
4
− β∑4i=1 ai
4
=
4∑
i=1
ai
[
mi
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λj
(
3λi,maxσ2i,max log 3−
(
λkj + λlj + λmj
)
H
(
αjλkj , αjλlj , αjλmj
)
σ¯2j
)
4
+ (1−mi)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λj(3λi,maxσ2i,max log 3)
4
]
−β
∑4
i=1 ai
4
(4.26)

Chapter 5
Game results
The payoff functions (4.25) and (4.26) we have defined in chapter 4 are complex.
In order to get a first insight into the game’s behavior (players’ best responses
and Nash equibrium), these payoff functions need to be simplified. Therefore, we
define a game Ge, where all mobility profile parameters are equal in all crossroads.
This scenario, studied in section 5.1, is a special case of the general game Gg
examined in section 5.2, after having got intuition about how the game behaved
with equal parameters. For both cases, Ge and Gg, we will formally analyse the
players’ behavior, i.e. their best responses and possible Nash equilibria, check
our analytical results with simulations and finally discuss them.
5.1 Equality game: Ge
f
(
λ, σ2
)
(5.1)
In this particular scenario, we first show that nodes’ best response is defined
by the number of mix zones the mobile nodes decide to deploy, regardless of
their placement and of the adversary’s stragegy. Moreover, we prove that until
adversary’s cost does not go beyond a certain threshold, which is a function of
the mobility parameters, attacker’s best response is to deploy his eavesdropping
stations wherever there is no mix zone. Finally, we show the existence of at least
one Nash equilibrium in this specific game Ge.
Assuming all mobility profile parameters equal, we have λi = λ, σ2i = σ
2, and
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µi = µ for all i. Note that, in the following, we have:
λi,max = λ ∀i
σ2i,max = σ
2 ∀i
αj = 13λ ∀j
σ¯2j = σ
2 ∀j
Replacing these values in equations (4.25) and (4.26), we can simplify nodes’ and
adversary’s payoff functions (the derivations are presented in A.1):
un =
4∑
i=1
mi
[
3λ2σ2 log 3− 4γλ− 1
16−∑4j=1mj
]
(5.2)
ua =
4∑
i=1
ai
[
3λ2σ2 log 3(1−mi)− β4
]
(5.3)
5.1.1 Nodes’ best response
We first state an important theorem defining the mobile nodes’ best response,
which depends only on the number of mix zones, Nn =
∑
imi, they deploy and
not on their particular placement.
Theorem 5.1. The nodes’ best response is independent of the adversary’s strat-
egy, depending only on the mobility parameters λ, σ2 and the cost of a pseudonym
γ. More formally, the nodes’ best response is expressed as the number of deployed
mix zones∗:
s∗n = N
∗
n = brn(λ, σ
2, γ) =
[
16− 4√
3λ2σ2 log 3− 4γλ
]
(5.4)
Note that Nn must be between 0 and 4.
Proof. First of all, as the parameters within the sum do not depend on i, we can
slightly change the payoff function, by expressing the sum over mi’s as one single
variable x, which is the number of mix zones the nodes deploy:
un = x
(
3λ2σ2 log 3− 4γλ− 1
16− x
)
(5.5)
Maximizing (5.5) with respect to x, results in:
∂un
∂sn
=
∂un
∂x
= 3λ2σ2 log 3− 4γλ− 1
16− x −
x
(16− x)2 = 0 (5.6)
∗[.] represents the nearest integer function.
5.1. EQUALITY GAME: GE 27
Rearranging the terms of (5.6), the number of mix zones that maximizes the
payoff can be computed by solving the following quadratic expression:
x2 − 32x+ 162 − 16
3λ2σ2 log 3− 4γλ = 0 (5.7)
Equation (5.7) has two solutions: x∗1,2 = 16± 4√3λ2σ2 log 3−4γλ .The only acceptable
solution is x∗2 = 16 − 4√3λ2σ2 log 3−4γλ . Indeed, x
∗
1 = 16 +
4√
3λ2σ2 log 3−4γλ > 16
cannot be a maximum since the second derivative of un is equal to − 32(16−x)3 > 0
when x > 16, which shows that it is a local minimum.
In other words, since all the traffic intensities of entries at each crossroads are
equal, entropy in the uncertainty measure is maximal. Therefore, mobile nodes
do not care about sniffing stations’ placement since, even with an eavesdropping
station at the same intersection, a mix zone would still mix nodes with high
efficiency. Moreover, since all crossroads have the same uncertainty value, the
nodes’ payoff function does not depend on the placement of mix zones, but only
on their number Nn.
Corollary 5.1. We notice in theorem 5.1 that nodes’ best response is independent
of the mix zones’ location and, thus, depends only on the number of mix zones
we deploy. Therefore, ∀sa ∈ Sa, the number of nodes’ best responses is equal to
all the possible combinations of N∗n mix zones amid 4 crossroads:
(
4
N∗n
)
=

1 if N∗n = 0
4 if N∗n = 1
6 if N∗n = 2
4 if N∗n = 3
1 if N∗n = 4
(5.8)
We are now able to write up nodes’ best response, i.e. the best number of
deployed mix zones, using threshold values on the pseudonym price γ, on the
traffic intensity λ or on the sojourn time variance σ2. It is interesting to express
the nodes’ best strategy with respect to those mobility and cost parameters since
mobile users’ decision (to deploy a mix zone or not) is directly based on them.
Explanations on how we derive these results can be found in A.1.1.
First, we express N∗n with fixed λ and σ2, and varying γ:
s∗n = N
∗
n(γ) =

0 if γ > γ1[
16− 4√
3λ2σ2 log 3−4γλ
]
if γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2
4 if γ < γ2
(5.9)
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where γ1 =
3λ2σ2 log 3−( 831)
2
4λ and γ2 =
3λ2σ2 log 3−( 825)
2
4λ .
This result is the most important of our thresholds since it allows us to com-
pare cost led by deployment of a mix zone with respect to mobility parameters.
Since nodes change their pseudonyms whenever they go through a mix zone, de-
ployment of a mix zone has a cost directly related to the price γ of a pseudonym.
Mobile nodes are then able to base their strategic decision, to add a mix zone
or not, on the values of γ. We furthermore notice that bounds on γ are growing
linearly with respect to σ2 but not with respect to λ.
We can also express mobile nodes’ best response with respect to bounds on
mobility parameters λ and σ2.
For fixed values of γ and σ2, nodes’ best response expressed as a function of
λ is
s∗n = N
∗
n(λ) =

0 if λ < λ1[
16− 4√
3λ2σ2 log 3−4γλ
]
if λ1 ≤ λ ≤ λ2
4 if λ > λ2
(5.10)
where λ1 =
2γ+
√
4γ2+3σ2 log 3( 831)
2
3σ2 log 3
and λ2 =
2γ+
√
4γ2+3σ2 log 3( 825)
2
3σ2 log 3
. In addition,
for fixed values of γ and λ, and varying σ2,
s∗n = N
∗
n(σ
2) =

0 if σ2 < σ21[
16− 4√
3λ2σ2 log 3−4γλ
]
if σ21 ≤ σ2 ≤ σ22
4 if σ2 > σ22
(5.11)
where σ21 =
( 831)
2
+4γλ
3λ2 log 3
and σ22 =
( 825)
2
+4γλ
3λ2 log 3
.
We remark that the greater is the cost γ, the greater have to be λ and σ2 to
prompt mobile nodes to deploy mix zones. In both cases, λ and σ2 must grow
linearly with respect to γ to keep the same best response.
5.1.2 Adversary’s best response
The second main result we derived is related to the adversary’s best response.
We first explain it briefly and write it up more formally in theorem 5.2.
The adversary’s best reponse behaves in two different ways, depending on
whether the benefit (function of λ and σ2) is greater than sniffing stations’ cost β
or not. In the latter case, his best response is to deploy no eavesdropping stations,
independently of the mobile nodes’ strategy. Since benefits are too small with
respect to costs, the adversary gets no incentive to sniff the network, regardless
of what mobile nodes do.
In the other case, when λ or σ2 are high enough with respect to β, the
adversary’s best response is to deploy its sniffing stations at every crossroads
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where the mobile nodes have not placed a mix zone. If the adversary placed a
sniffing station at the same intersection as a mix zone, then high nodes’ mixing
effectiveness due to uncertainty would prevent him to make any benefit. To
summarize, the adversary adopts a complementary strategy to the mobile nodes’
one.
We provide now the detailed steps for the adversary’s best response derivation.
We also clarify and formally define the threshold on cost that influences his best
response. As the adversary’s best response depends on nodes’ strategy, we first
consider two extreme scenarios in the following lemmas.
Lemma 5.1. If ~m =
[
0 0 0 0
]T
= s1n, then ua = Na
[
3λ2σ2 log 3− β4
]
where
Na =
∑
i ai. Therefore, ua is a linear function of the number of sniffing stations
and the best response is:
s∗a = N
∗
a = bra(λ, σ
2, β) =
{
4 if 3λ2σ2 log 3 > β4
0 if 3λ2σ2 log 3 ≤ β4
(5.12)
Proof. Replacing the mi’s by 0 in (5.3), we get:
4∑
i=1
ai
[
3λ2σ2 log 3− β
4
]
= Na
[
3λ2σ2 log 3− β
4
]
(5.13)
As (5.13) is a linear function of Na, we just care about whether its multiplicative
constant is negative or positive. If it is strictly positive, then ua is increasing
linearly with Na and so N∗a = 4. If (3λ2σ2 log 3− β4 ) is negative, the adversary’s
payoff is decreasing linearly with Na. The best response is then N∗a = 0.
This theorem shows us the importance of cost β for the adversary to get his
best response. With respect to the bound on β, he can change his best response
from four sniffing stations (if cost is cheap) to none of them (if cost is expensive).
Lemma 5.2. If ~m =
[
1 1 1 1
]T
= s16n , then ua = −β4Na. Since β > 0, the
best response is:
s∗a = N
∗
a = bra = 0 (5.14)
Proof. Replacing the mi’s by 1 in (5.3), we get:
4∑
i=1
ai
[
0− β
4
]
= −β
4
Na (5.15)
As (5.15) is decreasing with Na, the best response obviously is N∗a = 0.
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Using results from lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, we can now state the theorem on
the adversary’ best response, with respect to a threshold defined by the mobility
parameters λ and σ2 and the adversary’s cost β.
Theorem 5.2. For fixed values of λ and σ2, the adversary’s best response is a
function of β:
s∗a = bra(sn) = ~a
∗(β) (5.16)
where
a∗i =
{
1−mi if β < β1
0 if β ≥ β1
(5.17)
where β1 = 12λ2σ2 log 3.
Proof. Rewriting (5.3) and sorting terms with respect to nodes’ stragegy, we get:
ua = (3λ2σ2 log 3− β4 )
∑
i:mi=0
ai − β4
∑
j:mj=1
aj (5.18)
From lemma 5.2, we know that the adversary does not get any incentive to place
a sniffing station where there already is a mix zone. Formally, ∀j s.t. mj = 1,
a∗j = 0. Using results of lemma 5.1, we can assert that ∀i s.t. mi = 0, a∗i = 1
if 3λ2σ2 log 3 > β4 , i.e. β < 12λ
2σ2 log 3 and, a∗i = 0 if 3λ
2σ2 log 3 ≤ β4 , i.e.
β ≥ 12λ2σ2 log 3 .
5.1.3 Nash equilibrium
We are now able to state a theorem about the Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5.3. For given λ and σ2 in game Ge, there always exists at least one
Nash equilibrium. However, uniqueness is not always satisfied and depends on γ
and β.
Proof. Considering best response results of theorems 5.1 and 5.2, corollary 5.1
and equation (5.9), we can derive NE cases for all bounds on γ and β with respect
to γ1, γ2 and β1. We provide here an example.
If γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2 and N∗n = 2 following theorem 5.1, there are 6 Nash equilibria
according to corollary 5.1 and two groups of Nash equilibria can be identified.
If β > β1, the Nash equilibria are all the possible combinations of 2 mix zones
among 4 crossroads (there are 6 combinations) for the nodes’ strategies, and no
sniffing station for the adversary. If β ≤ β1, the Nash equilibria are still all the
combinations of 2 mix zones among 4 intersections for the mobile nodes, and, for
the adversary’s strategies, placement of eavesdropping stations wherever there is
no mix zone yet (complementary deployment).
Note finally that number of Nash equilibria depend on number of nodes’ best
responses defined in corollary 5.1. For instance, if N∗n = 0 or N∗n = 4, there is
one and only one Nash equilibrium.
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What we can notice regarding the Nash equilibria is that, first, the number
of Nash equilibria is growing like the number of nodes’ best responses. Thus,
when best number of mix zones’ is equal to 1, 2 or 3, we get multiple Nash
equilibria. On the other hand, as the adversary’s best response varies with respect
to the threshold on β, being either to place no eavesdropping station or the
complementary of mix zones’ placement, the Nash equilibria vary as well with
respect to this threshold. We provide some examples in the following in order
to show how best responses and Nash equilibria are changing with respect to
mobility and cost parameters.
5.1.4 Discussion and simulations
In this subsection, we do simulations using Matlab in order to verify whether our
analytical derivations are correct or not. We then discuss our simulated results
with respect to the formal ones.
We provide below some plots showing both players’ best responses and Nash
equilibria on the same graph. We first simulate with variable values of λ and
other parameters fixed. Afterwards, we display game’s behavior with respect
to varying values of β. Both of these simulations encompass more or less all
interesting results and behaviors that we could expect.
Let us set up our fixed values in the first scenario. Regarding the mobil-
ity parameters, as we said, traffic intensity λ is varying and we fix the sojourn
time variance to σ2 = 0.5s. We also fix the players’ cost: adversary’s cost of
sniffing stations management β = 1 (thus, one sniffing station costs 1/4), and
mobile nodes’ cost of one pseudonym γ = 0.1. We display some of the results for
λ ∈ (0,∞) in the following 3 figures. Note that s1n =
[
0 0 0 0
]T
is the nodes’
strategy to deploy no mix zone and s16n =
[
1 1 1 1
]T
is the nodes’ strategy
to activate four mix zones (all of them). Strategies s2n to s
5
n represent the use
of one mix zone, s6n to s
11
n , two mix zones, and s
12
n to s
15
n three mix zones. In
the same way, s1a =
[
0 0 0 0
]T
is the adversary’s strategy to place no eaves-
dropping station and s16a =
[
1 1 1 1
]T
is the adversary’s strategy to place
sniffing stations at all crossroads. Strategies s2a to s
5
a represent the placement of
one eavesdropping station, s6a to s
11
a , of two eavesdropping stations, and s
12
a to
s15a of three eavesdropping stations.
For λ ∈ (0, 0.271], nodes’ and adversary’s best responses are to deploy nothing,
neither mix zones nor sniffing stations (Figure 5.1). 0.271 should correspond
to threshold λ1 we have defined after equation 5.10. Using our numerical val-
ues, we get a theoretical threshold of λ1 = 0.2714, which matches very well
with our simulation result. When λ ∈ [0.272, 0.281], nodes get an incentive to
place one mix zone, at one of the crossroads. Adversary’s best response does
32 CHAPTER 5. GAME RESULTS
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Mobile nodes’ strategies
Ad
ve
rs
ar
y’s
 s
tra
te
gi
es
Best responses’ graph
 
 
BR of Nodes
BR of Adversary
NE
Figure 5.1: Simulation result with σ2 = 0.5s, β = 1 and γ = 0.1. For λ ∈
(0, 0.271], nodes’ best response is to deploy no mix zone and adversary’s best
response is to place no sniffing station. Thus, we get one Nash equilibrium, at
(s1n, s
1
a).
not change. If λ ∈ [0.282, 0.293], nodes increase their mix zones number to
two. Nodes’ best responses are thus all possible combinations of two mix zones
among four crossroads (Figure 5.2). Adversary’s best response remains to do
nothing. For λ ∈ [0.294, 0.308], nodes place three mix zones and adversary still
does nothing. 0.308 represent here threshold λ2 defined after equation 5.10. Af-
ter replacing our numerical values in the formal expression, we find λ2 = 0.3081,
which verifies the correspondence between our analytical and simulated results.
If λ ∈ [0.309, 0.324], mobile nodes place a mix zone at every crossroads and ad-
versary’s best response does not change. Finally, for λ ∈ [0.325,∞), nodes’ best
response is still to deploy four mix zones but, adversary’s one is to sniff crossroads
wherever there is no mix zone yet (Figure 5.3).
The second scenario fixes mobility parameters λ = 0.3 and σ2 = 0.5s, as well
as pseudonym’s cost γ = 0.1, and makes β vary from zero to infinity. In this
case, game behaves like in figure 5.4 for β ∈ (0, 0.856), and like in figure 5.5 for
β ∈ [0.856,∞). In the latter case, as adversary’s cost β is quite big, attacker’s
best response is to place no eavesdropping stations. Mobile nodes’ best response
is to deploy three mix zones since mobility parameters λ and σ2 are high enough
with respect to cost γ. In the second case, when β is small, then adversary’s best
response is to place sniffing stations where there is no mix zone yet.
We would like now to compare these empirical results with the analytical ones
we get in previous subsections. We can notice first that Figure 5.1 represents the
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Figure 5.2: Simulation result with σ2 = 0.5s, β = 1 and γ = 0.1. For λ ∈
[0.282, 0.293], nodes’ best responses are to deploy two mix zones and adversary’s
best response is to place no sniffing station. Thus, we get six Nash equilibria, at
(s6n, s
1
a), (s
7
n, s
1
a), (s
8
n, s
1
a), (s
9
n, s
1
a), (s
10
n , s
1
a) and (s
11
n , s
1
a).
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Figure 5.3: Simulation result with σ2 = 0.5s, β = 1 and γ = 0.1. For λ ∈
[0.325,∞[, nodes’ best response is to deploy four mix zones and adversary’s best
response is to place sniffing stations where there is no mix zone. Thus, we get
one Nash equilibrium, at (s16n , s
1
a).
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Figure 5.4: Simulation result with σ2 = 0.5s, λ = 0.3 and γ = 0.1. For β ∈
(0, 0.856), nodes’ best response is to deploy three mix zones (regardless of values
of β) and adversary’s best response is to place sniffing stations where there is no
mix zone. Thus, we get four Nash equilibria, at (s12n , s
5
a), (s
13
n , s
4
a), (s
14
n , s
3
a) and
(s15n , s
2
a).
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Figure 5.5: Simulation result with σ2 = 0.5s, λ = 0.3 and γ = 0.1. For β ∈
(0.856,∞), nodes’ best response is to deploy three mix zones (regardless of values
of β and adversary’s best response is to place no sniffing stations. Thus, we get
four Nash equilibria, at (s12n , s
1
a), (s
13
n , s
1
a), (s
14
n , s
1
a) and (s
15
n , s
1
a).
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Nash equiblibrium (s1n, s
1
a). So let us check if the empirical values we use to plot
this first graph correspond to the conditions on γ and β defined in equations (5.9)
and (5.17). For the values used in Figure 5.1, we have γ1 ∈ (0, 0.0996] and γ2
even smaller. Hence, as γ = 0.1, it is greater than γ1. Moreover, β1 ∈ (0, 0.6984],
which means that, since β = 1, it is also greater than threshold on β1. Since
we get the Nash equilibrium coming from the same best responses, this shows
that analytical and empirical results match very well. We check correspondence
between analytical Nash equilibria and simulations in the same way for other
figures (5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5), leading us to conclude to the accuracy of Nash
equilibria and best responses derived in game Ge.
This special scenario when mobility profile of the network is totally homo-
geneous helps us to get a good feeling of how the more general game Gg might
behave. We can be quite confident of the existence of Nash equilibria in Gg as
well. That is what we are going to look at now.
5.2 General game: Gg
Even though general game Gg has complex expressions of both mobile nodes’ and
adversary’s payoffs, we manage to find some interesting results. We show that
strategic decision of the adversary to place an eavesdropping station at crossroads
Ci is dependent on mobility parameters at this crossroads, and only dependent
on these parameters. In other words, the adversary’s decision to place a sniffing
station at Ci is independent of parameters at Cj , for all j 6= i (others than those
coming from crossroads Ci). Moreover, the adversary’s global best response is
equivalent to the union of all local best responses (at each crossroads). In con-
trary, nodes’ decision to deploy a mix zone at Ci does depend on other placements
of mix zones and on mobility parameters at different intersections. Mobile nodes
cannot split their strategic problem into smaller local ones at intersections and
have to take it as a whole. Finally, even though we are not able to prove it
formally, we reach one or more Nash equilibria in all our simulations.
5.2.1 Adversary’s best response
The main interesting result of Gg game is provided by adversary’s best response.
First, the decision to place a sniffing station or not at some crossroads to get a
best response is independent of other crossroads mobility parameters. Second, the
global adversary’s best response is equal to the union of the local best responses
at each crossroads. In order to show that, let us first rewrite equation (4.26) in
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its compact form:
ua =
4∑
i=1
ai
mi 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λj(Eimax − Ej)
4
+ (1−mi)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjE
i
max
4
− β∑i ai
4
(5.19)
We can then include the cost within the parenthesis and bring out ai:
ua =
4∑
i=1
ai
mi 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λj(Eimax − Ej)
4
+ (1−mi)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjE
i
max
4
− β
4

(5.20)
After a few steps, we can simplify our payoff and keep mi in front of only one
summation over j:
ua =
4∑
i=1
ai
 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjE
i
max
4
−mi
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjEj
4
− β
4
 (5.21)
Note that (5.21) is linear with respect to the ai’s. Therefore, the adversary, in
order to get his best response, is just concerned by the sign of the multiplicative
factor
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjE
i
max
4
−mi
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjEj
4
− β
4
(5.22)
In order to be beneficial to the adversary, this equation must be positive. We can
now derive a theorem on the adversary’s best response.
Theorem 5.4. The adversary’s best response is
s∗a = bra(sn) = ~a
∗ (5.23)
where
a∗i =

0 if
∑4i−1
j=4(i−1) λjE
i
max < β
1−mi if β <
∑4i−1
j=4(i−1) λjE
i
max <
∑4i−1
j=4(i−1) λjEj + β
1 if
∑4i−1
j=4(i−1) λjE
i
max >
∑4i−1
j=4(i−1) λjEj + β
(5.24)
Proof. All thresholds in (5.24) follow from sign evaluation of multiplicative factor
(5.22).
Developing Eimax in the first condition, we get the following threshold on β:∑
j:rj∈Ri
λj3λi,maxσ2i,max log 3 < β (5.25)
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or
λi,maxσ
2
i,maxλ¯i <
β
3 log 3
(5.26)
where λ¯i is the sum of all traffic intensities entering the intersection Ci. Hence,
if the multiplication of the maximal traffic intensity, the maximal delay variance
and the sum of traffic intensities entering the intersection is too small with respect
to the sniffing station’s cost, it prompts the adversary to do nothing, to deploy
no sniffing station at the specific crossroads Ci. In addition to the main results
described at the beginning of the section, theorem 5.4 also shows us that the
adversary’s best response depends on the mobile nodes’ strategy only under a
certain condition (second case of equation (5.24)). Under this condition, the
adversary’s best response is to place a sniffing station if there is no mix zone at
the same intersection, just like in theorem 5.2 of section 5.1.
5.2.2 Nodes’ best response
Mobile nodes’ payoff function (4.25) is very complex to analyse in the general
case. In the following, we attempt to provide the simplest possible expression
of un and get some interesting results. However, due to high complexity of the
derivative of un with respect to sn, analytical derivation of mobile nodes’ best
response is not feasible in this report. We will thus use simulations to see how
nodes behave in game Gg. To show why this payoff function is too complicated
to be formally analysed, let us first rewrite equation (4.25) in its compact form:
un =
4∑
i=1
mi
ai 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjEj
4
+ (1− ai)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjE
i
max
4

− γ(F ·~1)T ~m− (F ·
~1)T ~µm
(F ·~1)T 4~µ− (F ·~1)T ~µm
(5.27)
We then express costs as summations instead of matrices operations:
un =
4∑
i=1
mi
ai 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjEj
4
+ (1− ai)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λjE
i
max
4

− γ
4∑
i=1
mi
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λj −
∑4
i=1 µimi
∑4i−1
j=4(i−1) λj
4
∑4
i=1 µi
∑4i−1
j=4(i−1) λj −
∑4
i=1 µimi
∑4i−1
j=4(i−1) λj
(5.28)
We can now bring mi out and keep ai in front of only one summation over j:
un =
4∑
i=1
mi
 λ¯iEmaxi
4
− ai
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λj(Emaxi − Ej)
4
− γλ¯i − µiλ¯i
4
∑4
k=1 λ¯kµk −
∑4
k=1 λ¯kµkmk

(5.29)
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where λ¯i is the sum of all traffic intensities entering the intersection Ci. We notice
in this last equation that un is not linear with respect to the mi’s since the mi’s
are also included in the denominator of last cost. Hence, it is very complicated
to get the best response using derivatives with respect to the mi’s and we would
rather simulate the game in order to see how the mobile nodes behave in the
general game. Before simulating, we can already assert that mobile nodes’ best
response at intersection Ci must depend on mobility parameters and costs at
other intersections.
5.2.3 Discussion and simulations
We provide here simulations results first, and then discuss them and verify
whether they seem to match with analytical results or not. We provide in the
following some plots showing, as in section 5.1, both players’ best responses and
Nash equilibria on the same graph. We first vary λ0, which represents the traffic
intensity of the road in the North of the first intersection. We fix other mobility
and cost parameters: 
λi = 0.2 ∀i 6= 0
µi = 2 ∀i
σ2i = 0.5 ∀i
β = 1
γ = 0.1
(5.30)
We display the results for λ0 ∈ (0,∞) in the following 5 figures. For λ0 ∈
(0, 0.304], nodes’ and adversary’s best responses are to deploy nothing, neither
mix zones nor eavesdropping stations (Figure 5.6). We thus observe a unique
Nash equilibrium, at (s1n, s
1
a). Even though λ0 goes beyond 0.2, neither the mobile
nodes nor the adversary get enough benefit to deploy a mix zone or a sniffing
station. For λ0 ∈ [0.305, 0.414], mobile nodes get incentive to deploy a mix zone at
the first intersection if the adversary’s strategy is to do nothing (Figure 5.7). The
nodes’ best response depends on the adversary’s strategy a1 and shows us that,
contrary to game Ge, in game Gg, the nodes’ best strategy is not independent
of the attacker’s strategy. Note that the Nash equilibrium here is to deploy zero
eavesdropping station (s1a) and one mix zone at intersection 1 (s
2
n). For λ0 ∈
[0.415, 0.595], nodes’ best response remains as in previous case but the attacker’s
best response changes from doing nothing to place an eavesdropping device at
C1 whether there is no mix zone yet (Figure 5.8). The players’ best responses
are thus symmetric and the game reaches two Nash equilibria, at (s1n, s
2
a) and
(s2n, s
1
a). From λ0 = 0.596, the adversary changes again his best response to
the deployment of one sniffing station at intersection 1, regardless of the mobile
nodes’ strategy (Figure 5.9). We then get a Nash equilibrium at (s1n, s
2
a). To
be complete, note that for values of λ0 greater than 4, the mobile nodes’ best
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Figure 5.6: Simulation result with λi = 0.2 ∀i 6= 0, µi = 2 and σ2i = 0.5s ∀i,
β = 1 and γ = 0.1. For λ0 ∈ (0, 0.304], nodes’ best response is to deploy no mix
zone and adversary’s best response is to place no sniffing station. Thus, we get
one Nash equilibrium, at (s1n, s
1
a).
response is also to deploy a mix zone at C1, regardless of the adversary’s strategy
(Figure 5.10). However, first, in reality traffic intensities are never so high and,
second, if 4 nodes per second enter through one road, it is completely improbable
to have only 0.6 leaving nodes per second in total via the three other roads.
Note that, for the four realistic ranges of λ0 values, the game’s equilibria evolve,
for increasing λ0, in an interesting way: first, Nash equilibrium is (s1n, s
1
a); then it
is (s2n, s
1
a); there are next (s
1
n, s
2
a) and (s
2
n, s
1
a); and finally (s
1
n, s
2
a). Even though,
at the beginning, mix zones seem to be more “powerful” than eavesdropping
stations (when NE = (s2n, s
1
a)), adversary’s devices become the ones remaining at
equilibrium when λ0 reaches 0.595 (s1n, s
2
a), with a transition phase in-between
(with both NE).
We would like now to verify whether thresholds derived in (5.24) for the
adversary’s best response match with the simulations. By replacing the numer-
ical values we have fixed for our simulations in (5.26), we get, for λ0 = 0.414,
3 log 3λ1,maxσ21,maxλ¯1 = 0.998 < β = 1 which matches well with the adversary’s
best response shown in figures 5.6 and 5.7 (s∗a = s1a). If λ0 becomes equal to
0.415, 3 log 3λ1,maxσ21,maxλ¯1 = 1.0014 > β = 1 and the adversary places a sniffing
station if there is no mix zone yet, like in figure 5.8. We verify in the same way
the upper threshold in (5.24), which matches with results shown in figure 5.9
(s∗a = s2a).
We can extend the results achieved for C1 to other crossroads C2, C3 and C4,
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Figure 5.7: Simulation result with λi = 0.2 ∀i 6= 0, µi = 2 and σ2i = 0.5s ∀i,
β = 1 and γ = 0.1. For λ0 ∈ [0.305, 0.414], nodes’ best response is to deploy one
mix zone at C1 if there is no sniffing station yet, and adversary’s best response
is to place no sniffing station. Thus, we get one Nash equilibrium, at (s2n, s
1
a).
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Figure 5.8: Simulation result with λi = 0.2 ∀i 6= 0, µi = 2 and σ2i = 0.5s ∀i,
β = 1 and γ = 0.1. For λ0 ∈ [0.415, 0.595], nodes’ best response is to deploy one
mix zone at C1 if there is not a sniffing station yet, and adversary’s best response
is to place one sniffing station at C1 if there is not a mix zone yet. Thus, we get
two Nash equilibria, at (s2n, s
1
a) and (s
1
n, s
2
a).
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Figure 5.9: Simulation result with λi = 0.2 ∀i 6= 0, µi = 2 and σ2i = 0.5s ∀i,
β = 1 and γ = 0.1. For λ0 ∈ [0.596, 4.499], nodes’ best response is to deploy
one mix zone at C1 if there is not already a sniffing station, and adversary’s best
response is to place one sniffing station at C1, regardless of the nodes’ strategy.
Thus, we get one Nash equilibrium, at (s1n, s
2
a).
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Mobile nodes’ strategies
Ad
ve
rs
ar
y’s
 s
tra
te
gi
es
Best responses’ graph
 
 
BR of Nodes
BR of Adversary
NE
Figure 5.10: Simulation result with λi = 0.2 ∀i 6= 0, µi = 2 and σ2i = 0.5s ∀i,
β = 1 and γ = 0.1. For λ0 ∈ [4.5,∞), nodes’ best response is to deploy one mix
zone at C1, regardless of the adversary’s strategy, and adversary’s best response
is to place one sniffing station at C1, regardless of the nodes’ strategy. Thus, we
get one Nash equilibrium, at (s2n, s
2
a).
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at least for the adversary’s strategic decisions since these decisions are dependent
only on the specific intersection we are looking at. Moreover, as we have already
seen, the global best response of the adversary is the union of the local ones.
Finally, we simulate for other varying values of λi’s, i 6= 0. We notice that,
when changing values of λi’s for different crossroads than the first one, it changes
the threshold values on λ0 for which the mobile nodes’ best response is to deploy
a mix zone at the first intersection or not. This shows that our claim at the
beginning of section 5.2, that the nodes’ decision to deploy a mix zone at a
particular intersection depends on mobility parameters at other intersections, is
correct.
We have not simulated for other varying mobility profile parameters, such as
sojourn time variables σ2i ’s or µi’s. It would be interesting to do so in future
work, as well as changing players’ costs for the general game Gg.
5.3 Discussion
The purpose of Ge was first to give us an insight into the general game Gg.
Simple though it was, this equality game provided us very interesting results and
allowed us to get intuition for the existence of Nash equilibria in our model. This
intuition about the general game was confirmed by our simulations. Contrary to
Ge game, Gg simulations showed us only one or two Nash equilibria. In addition,
even though the mobile nodes’ best response did not depend on the adversary’s
strategy in Ge, it happened to be highly dependent on the attacker’s placement of
sniffing stations in the general case Gg. On the other hand, the adversary’s best
response in Ge was either to do nothing or to deploy sniffing stations wherever
there were no mix zone yet. Hence, in the “best” case, the adversary’s best
strategy was still dependent on the mobile nodes’ strategy. In Gg, a third case
appeared for the attacker’s best response: to always deploy a sniffing station at
an intersection, regardless of nodes’ strategy, if benefit at this intersection was
high enough with respect to sniffing stations’ cost.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Preventing third parties to track mobile users’ movements is one of the main top-
ics of research in wireless privacy. The wireless nature of mobile communications
allow malicious individuals to easily eavesdrop important personal information,
such as identity. In order to thwart this threat on location privacy, many privacy-
preserving mechanisms have already been developed.
In this thesis, we chose active mix zones to protect mobile users’ location pri-
vacy. We furthermore assumed that a local passive adversary tries to jeopardize
it with sniffing devices. On the one hand, mobile nodes want to maximize their
payoff, i.e. their location privacy. On the other hand, the attacker attempts to
optimize its own utility, i.e. his tracking power. Assuming both players being
rational, we analyzed the interplay between the mobile nodes’ strategic decisions
and the adversary strategic choice. We developed a payoff model that takes into
account most of important game’s parameters. We modeled benefit of mobile
nodes as the total mixing effectiveness of their deployed mix zones. We included
the cost of changing pseudonyms, as well as the cost of being silent within the
mix zones. On the other side, benefit of the attacker is proportional to his track-
ing power but weakened by mixing uncertainty due to mix zones placement. In
order to let players decide on their strategies prior to the operation of the mobile
network, we presented a simplified flow-based metric.
By studying our model using a game-theoretic approach, we showed, analyt-
ically in a specific scenario (homogeneous mobility profile), and with simulations
in the general case, that our game always reaches at least one Nash equilibrium.
We furthermore studied mobile nodes’ and adversary’s best responses and proved
formally what they are when mobility profile is homogeneous. We showed that,
in this particular case, the nodes’ best response does not depend on the attacker’s
strategy. In addition, nodes’ payoff is proportional to the number of mix zones
they deploy, regardless of where they locate their mix zones. On the contrary, in
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the general game, the nodes’ best response highly depends on the eavesdropping
stations deployment and the mobile users rarely get benefit to locate a mix zone
where there already is an adversary’s station. We also showed that the adver-
sary’s best response depends on the mobile nodes’ deployment of mix zones, in
both equality and general games. However, under certain conditions on sniffing
stations’ cost, the attacker gets no incentive to deploy eavesdropping devices, re-
gardless of what the nodes do. Finally, by means of simulations, we verified the
accuracy of our analytical results.
In future work, it would be interesting to develop a more complex mobility
parameters model. We could for instance relax our assumption of independency
between the traffic intensities and sojourn time statistics. In real life, expected
sojourn time within crossroads is dependent on the traffic congestion. Another
possible improvement could be to extend our model to an incomplete informa-
tion game. Indeed, the adversary may not have all nodes’ payoff information,
especially their mobility profile, and vice versa, the nodes may not know all ad-
versary’s payoff. Last but not least, mobile nodes can get high incentive to change
pseudonyms within the non-monitored area, i.e. where the local adversary has
no coverage. This would be less costly for nodes since they would not need to
stay quiet during the operation. Based on work done by Buttya´n et al. [5], we
could model uncertainty and mixing efficiency of such passive mix zones.
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Appendix A
Game results
A.1 Equality game
Derivation of equations (5.2) and (5.3):
un =
4∑
i=1
mi
[
ai
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λ · 3λ · log 3 · σ2
4
+ (1− ai)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λ(3λσ2 log 3)
4
]
− γ4λ
4∑
i=1
mi − 4λµ
∑4
i=1mi
4 · 16λµ− 4λµ∑4i=1mi
=
4∑
i=1
mi
[
ai(3λ2σ2 log 3) + (1 + ai)3λ2σ2 log 3
]
− γ4λ
4∑
i=1
mi − 4λµ
∑4
i=1mi
64λµ− 4λµ∑4i=1mi
=
4∑
i=1
mi
[
3λ2σ2 log 3− 4γλ− 4µλ
64λµ− 4µλ∑4j=1mj
]
=
4∑
i=1
mi
[
3λ2σ2 log 3− 4γλ− 1
16−∑4j=1mj
]
(A.1)
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ua =
4∑
i=1
ai
mi 4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λ(3λσ2 log 3− 3λσ2 log 3)
4
+ (1−mi)
4i−1∑
j=4(i−1)
λ(3λσ2 log 3)
4

− β
∑4
i=1 ai
4
=
4∑
i=1
ai
[
3λ2σ2 log 3(1−mi)− β4
]
(A.2)
A.1.1 Nodes’ best response
Theorem A.1. For fixed values of γ and σ2, the nodes’ best response is a function
of λ:
N∗n(λ) =

0 if λ < λ1[
16− 4√
3λ2σ2 log 3−4γλ
]
if λ1 ≤ λ ≤ λ2
4 if λ > λ2
(A.3)
where λ1 =
2γ+
√
4γ2+3σ2 log 3( 831)
2
3σ2 log 3
and λ2 =
2γ+
√
4γ2+3σ2 log 3( 825)
2
3σ2 log 3
Proof. From theorem 5.1, we know that maximal payoff is reached for
x = 16− 4√
3λ2σ2 log 3− 4γλ (A.4)
Then, in order to get N∗n = 4, we must have x > 3.5, i.e.,
16− 4√
3λ2σ2 log 3− 4γλ > 3.5 (A.5)
After some calculation steps, we reach the following quadratic inequality:
3λ2σ2 log 3− 4γλ−
(
8
25
)2
> 0 (A.6)
Solving (A.6) at equality, we get two solutions:
λ1,2 =
2γ ±
√
4γ2 + 3σ2 log 3
(
8
25
)2
3σ2 log 3
(A.7)
Since λ is positive, the only acceptable solution is λ1 =
2γ+
√
4γ2+3σ2 log 3( 825)
2
3σ2 log 3
. As
the quadratic function in (A.6) is convex, x is greater than 3.5 for
λ >
2γ +
√
4γ2 + 3σ2 log 3
(
8
25
)2
3σ2 log 3
(A.8)
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In the same way, we must have verify that x < 0.5 to get N∗n = 0. This is reached
for
λ <
2γ +
√
4γ2 + 3σ2 log 3
(
8
31
)2
3σ2 log 3
(A.9)
Theorem A.2. For fixed values of λ and σ2, the nodes’ best response is a function
of γ:
N∗n(γ) =

0 if γ > γ1[
16− 4√
3λ2σ2 log 3−4γλ
]
if γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2
4 if γ < γ2
(A.10)
where γ1 =
3λ2σ2 log 3−( 831)
2
4λ and γ2 =
3λ2σ2 log 3−( 825)
2
4λ
Proof. In the same way as proof of theorem A.1, we get the inequality (A.6). As
it is linear with respect to γ, we just need to isolate γ. Hence, in order to have
N∗n = 4, γ must verify
γ <
3λ2σ2 log 3− ( 825)2
4λ
(A.11)
In the same way, in order to have N∗n equal to zero, γ must satisfy
γ >
3λ2σ2 log 3− ( 831)2
4λ
(A.12)
Theorem A.3. For fixed values of λ and γ, the nodes’ best response is a function
of σ2:
N∗n(σ
2) =

0 if σ2 < σ21[
16− 4√
3λ2σ2 log 3−4γλ
]
if σ21 ≤ σ2 ≤ σ22
4 if σ2 > σ22
(A.13)
where σ21 =
( 831)
2
+4γ¯λ¯
3λ2 log 3
and σ22 =
( 825)
2
+4γ¯λ¯
3λ2 log 3
Proof. The demonstration is very similar to the proof of theorem A.2. We can
also reuse inequality (A.6) of theorem A.1 and get a linear inequality with respect
to σ2. Therefore, N∗n = 4 if the following condition is verified
σ2 >
(
8
25
)2 + 4γλ
3λ2 log 3
(A.14)
In the same way, N∗n = 0 whenever
σ2 <
(
8
31
)2 + 4γλ
3λ2 log 3
(A.15)
